with inherent risk of accidents causing loss of lives, grievous injuries, property losses and environmental damages. The most common type of hazmat road accident happens to be the releases (78%) of hazardous substances, followed by fires (28%), explosions (14%) and vapour/ gas clouds (6 %.).
transportation of hazardous materials is very risky affair, but unavoidable. The situation is no different, rather more serious for India compounded by the lack of public awareness on the probable consequences. The number and the extent of losses that occurred in previous years in India are related to hazardous material transportation accidents.
According to the Eleventh five year plan on transportation in India report [1] , Transportation sector accounts for 6.4% of GDP. Also, Road transport has emerged as the dominant segment in India's transportation sector with a share of 4.5 per cent in India's GDP in comparison to railways (source: National Accounts released by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO). Besides, the cost of road accidents is estimated in the range 1 to 3 per cent of GDP.
Occurrence of accidents and road fatalities is an outcome of interplay of a number of factors which among others include length of road network, vehicle population, human population and adherence/enforcement of road safety regulations. It has also been brought out that about two-thirds of the persons are killed in National Highways and State Highways.
An analysis of Major Hazard Incidents Data Service (MHIDAS) of HSE, UK on worldwide data from 1980-2004 on 1932 hazmat transportation related incidents revealed that 63% accidents happened on road of which highways constitutes to 81.4% of accidents. The most common type of hazmat road accident happens to be the releases (78%) of hazardous substances, followed by fires (28%), explosions (14%) and vapour/ gas clouds (6 %.) [2] .
The paper intents to highlight a part of a study that is underway estimating initially the probable 'Impact Zones' likely to be caused by one flammable (LPG) and one toxic (ethylene oxide) chemicals being transported through a sizable segment of a State Highway (SH-6) connecting three notified Industrial zones in Surat district in Western India housing 26 MAH industrial units, for hazard zone mapping on three selected 'Hotspots' along the highway stretch. Based, on the quantitative values of 'Impact Distances' and the number of affected population, the District Emergency Plan is being augmented in terms of Capacity building for evacuation and medical preparedness. Fig.1 . Two National Highways NH-6 and NH-8 pass through the outskirt of the city and are connected by State Highways SH-6 and SH-66. Fig. 1 The MAH Units in the Industrial District of Surat As many as 30 hazardous chemicals (both raw materials and product) are being transported to and fro the three industrial areas through the State and National Highways. For the present study a 6.5 Km stretch of the State Highway SH-6 was taken and two UN Class-2 hazardous chemicals, LPG and Ethylene Oxide are selected. LPG is highly flammable and can cause fire and explosion, whereas ethylene oxide is both flammable as well as toxic.
The study area enjoys a tropical climate with average rainfall of 2500 mm a year.
III. SELECTING 'HOTSPOTS'
Three 'Hotspots' along the entire 6.5 Km length of the SH-6 was selected based on the following criteria: a) Population of road transports passing through the road segment carrying the study chemicals. b) Population density of the area within 500 meters on both sides of the road. c] A pool fire causing heat radiation From the BLEVE model (Fig.4) , it is possible to calculate the radius of the fireball and thermal load. Similarly, peak overpressure caused due to expansion of vapour and flash-off can be estimated. Catastrophic failure causing 'Total Rupture' of ethylene oxide tanker releasing major quantities of the content. The worst-case scenario has been considered under worst metrological conditions.
V. CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA
The failure cases for fire & explosion and toxic release scenarios [3] will be as mentioned below: The BLEVE effects have been calculated using Effects-I software of TNO following the criteria given by the Technica, World Bank [3] . B) Toxic Release For toxic release scenarios involving ethylene oxide, a two phase release scenario is taken and heavy gas dispersion model is chosen. One simplified approach is to specify a toxic concentration criterion above which it is assumed that individuals exposed to this value will be in danger. This approach has led to many criteria promulgated by several government agencies and private associations.
Emergency exposure guidance levels (ERPGs) is one such criteria which are prepared by an industry task force and are published by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). Three concentration ranges are provided as a consequence of exposure to a specific substance: i) ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing effects other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
ii) ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.
iii)ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
The dispersion calculations are based on ALOHA model (EPA, 2000) and the consequence distances are estimated for ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 [4] .
In both the Fire & Explosion and Toxic release cases, the criteria of 'Alert zone' and 'Intervention Zone' criteria [5] have been applied which is put in Table-II. TABLE II  ALERT AND INTERVENTION ZONE The above criteria both for 'Alert and Intervention zones' have been relaxed as against suggested by APARICIO et al., 2006 [5] , as it warrants practicality and rationalization considering the population density and the logistics in Indian scenario.
Besides, Initial Isolation Zone based on the IDLH value and the Protective Action Zone based on the STEL concentration have been estimated (Fig. 5 ) which found usefulness in the emergency evacuation planning of the affected area. The Initial Isolation Zone defines an area SURROUNDING the incident in which persons may be exposed to dangerous (upwind) and life threatening (downwind) concentrations of material. The Protective Action Zone defines an area DOWNWIND from the incident in which persons may become incapacitated and unable to take protective action and/or incur serious or irreversible health effects [6] . The District Crisis Group has augmented its responses to any emergency involving hazmat road tankers in the selected hotspots.
VI. RESULTS
As discussed earlier, two fire and explosion scenarios are considered:
i. BLEVE of LPG Road Tanker with worst case of total release of the tanker content. The estimated damage distances for Heat Radiation and the overpressure distances have been given in Table-III and Table-IV. Table-V and  Table- VI. iii) For Ethylene Oxide toxic dispersion without fire, the IDLH, ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 limits have been calculated using ALOHA dispersion software by taking catastrophic total rupture of ethylene oxide tanker under worst meteorological conditions i.e. in 1.5 m/sec of wind speed (4) and stability class of F, and the results are tabulated in Table -VII. Table- VIII which show that the actual situation in the study area is likely to be worse if we take a worst case release scenario, as the conditions of meteorology and the population density would substantially differ from other parts of the world. The estimated damage distances for each 'Hotspots' are mapped on the location map of the entire stretch of the State highway segment (6.5 Km) for various fire/ explosion scenarios e.g. Thermal radiation, Overpressure and also for toxic dispersion, refer Fig.6 (a & b) , Fig.7 (a & b) and Fig.8 respectively.
Based on the estimated effect distances and the approximate number of populations that might be affected 'hotspot ranking is determined taking the year 2001 census data and the population density of the study area into consideration. The results are tabulated at Table-IX. 
VIII. RANKING THE 'HOTSPOTS'
The selected 'Hotspots' have been ranked based on the consequence estimates of accidental BLEVE cases involving both the selected chemicals and also the toxic effect distances.
i) Accordingly, the study finds that the 'Hotspot-3' is having highest consequence risk in terms of number of people likely to be generally affected within the estimated impact zones, both from fire & explosion as well as from toxic effects point of view, based on the population of the area. ii)
The 'Hotspot-2' is basically surrounded by industries and the damage distances goes deep into their boundary areas which may cause any subsequent fire and explosion cases, escalating the emergency. However, the protection and preparedness of the area is much superior compared to other isolated hotspots thereby situations could be brought under control quickly. iii)
The 'Hotspot-1' is a four -road junction with residential colonies and recreational complexes ( Fig.2 ) and any incident of BLEVE and Toxic release will be of great consequences, as the administrative services are at considerable distance away. The preparedness has to be of high order in this location. 
IX. EVACUATION AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS
Based on the results of the study, it has been proposed to the Local Administration to locate its emergency evacuation centers in meteorologically safer places. The proposed evacuation centers are indicated in Fig.9 . Fig. 9 The Depiction of Evacuation Centers over the plot plan of study area Ethylene oxide in low concentrations inhaled will cause delayed nausea. Inhalation of high concentrations results in a narcotic and possible neurotoxic effect --possibly followed by coughing, vomiting, and irritation to the respiratory passages which will eventually lead to emphysema, bronchitis, and pulmonary edema. Ethylene oxide is a suspected human carcinogen. Exposure may cause toxicity to the human reproductive system including spontaneous abortions.
Prompt medical attention is mandatory in all cases of overexposure. Rescue personnel should be equipped with selfcontained breathing apparatus and be Cognizant of extreme fire and explosion hazard.
X. CONCLUSION
In the context of risk arising out of Hazmat Transportation on highway segments passing through the industrial business houses, the paper discussed the consequence analysis results based on the various accident scenarios involving one each of LPG and ethylene oxide road tankers on a State Highway segment (SH-6) at Surat in western India.
The likely damage distances thus estimated through wellknown software models for three selected 'Hotspots' along the 6.5 Km State Highway segment have been used to rank the "Hotspots" which would help developing the appropriate emergency preparedness on the part of both industries and local administration.
